ISSUE #012 · WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 2026
Copper posted its first losing week since June, snapping a 10-week winning streak as Washington’s refined-copper tariff decision stalled and some of the policy premium came out of the market.
And the retreat continued this week, with COMEX spot down 4.6% from last Tuesday’s snapshot and LME three-month copper down 4.3%, while LME inventories added 11,500 tonnes as COMEX stocks barely moved. More broadly, mining equities took the tariff news hardest — the Global X Copper Miners ETF fell 7.2% on Thursday, with Freeport down more than 6%.
More broadly, a firmer dollar, rising inventories and renewed rate concerns have added further pressure. But, for now at least, this still looks more like a repricing of the tariff trade, which leads neatly into this week’s feature.
Who has the copper, and who controls the bottlenecks?
01 THE SETUP
The biggest story this week — finding itself caught between re-shoring arguments and affordability concerns, Washington’s refined-copper decision stalled again. But this is achingly familiar territory by now.
So this week, we’re stepping back to look at the broader news cycle this story is living within. A quick sample:
Africa — The DRC, which we looked at last week, just approved a task force to implement its U.S. strategic-minerals partnership, aimed at pulling Western capital into a copper and cobalt sector long dominated by Chinese investment.
Latin America — Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru signed a strategic-minerals pact, Chile and Argentina separately revived their 1997 Mining Integration Treaty, and Chile has been courting investors for a $1.7bn domestic smelter, even as it acknowledges a backdrop of negative TC/RCs and limited copper concentrate supply.
China — Beijing halted sulphuric-acid exports in April to secure domestic supply, heavy rare-earth shipments to Japan stayed shut through June, and China remains the outstanding regulator on the $54bn Anglo American–Teck merger with the review clock reportedly suspended.
Europe — Leaders have framed raw-material dependence as exposure to economic coercion, Brussels designated 47 strategic raw-material projects, and is backing work on European price benchmarks.
United States — Project Vault, a roughly $12bn critical-minerals stockpile, a proposed Western minerals bloc with price supports and common standards, and a hardening 2027 deadline for the defense industry to stop purchasing rare earths, magnets, tungsten, molybdenum and tantalum from China, Russia, Iran or North Korea.
Australia — Joint U.S.–Australian critical-minerals backing above $3.5bn, plus A$600m to keep the Mount Isa smelter and Townsville refinery alive.
The pattern here is simple. To quote the IEA, critical minerals are living in “an increasingly complex geopolitical environment” which has resulted in “critical minerals [moving] to the forefront of countries’ energy, economic and national security agendas”
So rather than spend another week inside a single story, this week we’re mapping the board — who has the copper, who can process it, who uses it, and who is trying to change their position.
02 WHY IT MATTERS
The broad risk is that copper starts to look a little less like an efficient market of fungible, mobile metal, and a little more like one shaped by the whims and wishes of whoever has the mines, processing capacity, inventories, and rules governing trade.
The tariff episode is the cleanest illustration of this — an unresolved threat, applied to one link in the chain, moved an extraordinary quantity of metal (and with it, the price of said metal).
That makes it worth knowing where things actually sit. If a jurisdiction can reshape supply or demand, then who mines the metal, who processes it, who buys it, and who writes the rules are all inputs to the market rather than background detail.
03 THE DECODE
Who has the copper
Chile leads mine production at roughly 5.3 million tonnes in 2025, followed by the DRC at about 3.2 million, then Peru, and China. Russia, the U.S., Zambia, Indonesia, Australia, Mexico, and Kazakhstan all contribute meaningfully. China’s own mines produce around 1.8 million tonnes — far less than its processing industry consumes.
Reserves are similarly dispersed:
Sources: SCRREEN, reproducing USGS 2026; USGS. Reserves describe economically recoverable deposits under stated assumptions — not the full resource base (ICSG).
Near-term additions come mostly from established centres:
The Oyu Tolgoi underground ramp-up in Mongolia
Chile’s Centinela second concentrator at around 144kt annually (the widely quoted 170kt is CuEq)
Kansanshi S3 in Zambia and continued development at Kamoa-Kakula.
The Vicuña district on the Argentina–Chile border could become significant, though the integrated case is a preliminary economic assessment rather than operating supply. Pakistan’s Reko Diq belongs on the longer-term map, but a security-related slowdown makes it a weak example of assured diversification.
Who can process it
China accounted for roughly half of global smelter output in 2025, having supplied more than 90% of the growth since 2005 (however, it is still a net importer of refined copper).
Sources: USGS; ICSG. Actual output, not nameplate capacity. Europe’s base is distributed across Germany, Poland, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, and Sweden (SCRREEN).
A couple of notes here:
The DRC is not merely a feedstock appendage to Chinese smelters — much of its copper is produced by leaching and electrowinning, which yields refined metal without conventional smelting.
Chile’s mining and smelting shares do not describe its entire processing position — Chile also produces refined copper through leaching and electrowinning.
Who uses it
Measured where metal first becomes wire rod, sheet, or tube, usage runs roughly:
Sources: ICSG. “Rest of Asia” calculated as Asia’s 76% less China’s 58%; “Other regions” calculated as rounded remainder.
This measures first transformation, not where the finished cars and grid equipment end up — so it understates Western final demand, which arrives partly embodied. India and Southeast Asia are the emerging demand centres worth tracking on urbanisation, construction, and cooling.
Who is trying to change position
Chile: Codelco–Glencore smelter proposed at 1.5 Mt of concentrate a year, with operations targeted for 2032–33.
What remains: More domestic processing; overseas industrial demand still sets the terms.
Indonesia: Export restrictions and domestic-smelter requirements, with temporary exemptions when plants underperform.
What remains: Processing moves onshore; exemptions show the limits of forcing it early.
India: Adani’s Kutch Copper, 500,000 t nameplate, became an LME-approved brand in July 2026.
What remains: Cathode imports replaced by concentrate imports.
DRC: Kamoa-Kakula smelter producing anodes and selling acid locally.
What remains: Anodes still require final refining elsewhere.
Australia: Up to A$600m over three years for Mount Isa and Townsville.
What remains: Preserves capacity; does not make it commercially self-sustaining.
U.S.: Tariff expectations drew in metal; the refined decision remains unresolved.
What remains: Location of metal changed; capacity to refine it did not.
EU: Strategic projects, investment support and RESourceEU stockpiling work.
What remains: Diversification across the chain; nowhere near copper self-sufficiency.
China: Roughly 2 Mt of planned smelting capacity halted, with output cuts agreed among leading smelters.
What remains: Manages overcapacity chasing scarce feedstock; announced ≠ verified.
For context on the European benchmarks: the Critical Raw Materials Act targets 10% of annual needs from domestic extraction by 2030, 40% from processing and 25% from recycling, with single-country dependence capped at 65% at relevant stages.
04 WHAT TO WATCH
No particular tells this week. But most announcements in this space can be sized up with three questions:
Who is it trying to depend on less? Almost every move here names a counterparty, even when the press release doesn’t. The DRC is courting Western capital into a sector dominated by Chinese investment. Europe is building price benchmarks because Chinese price-setting makes Western projects hard to finance. Washington’s stockpile and seabed permits point the same direction. Identify the target and the logic of the move usually follows.
Is it moving metal or moving capability? These operate on completely different clocks. Inventory relocates in months, as the U.S. has just demonstrated without building anything. Processing capacity takes the better part of a decade — Chile’s proposed smelter targets 2032–33.
Who still has to say yes? Capacity is not the only form of leverage. Beijing owns no part of Anglo American or Teck, but the $54bn merger waits on its review clock regardless. The same applies to inputs rather than metal: April’s sulphuric-acid export halt reached Chilean and Indonesian production without touching copper at all, and the rare-earth shutoff to Japan is what everyone else is insuring against. Leverage can sit a step or two away from the thing being fought over.
/ Generation Mining Secures Full Project Financing to Build Canada’s Next Critical Minerals Mine
Generation Mining says its Marathon copper-palladium project is now fully financed, completing a roughly C$1.3 billion construction package spanning commercial debt, equity, streaming, equipment finance, and Canadian government-backed capital. Early works expected to begin in Q4.
/ Eldorado Gold Announces First Copper-Gold Concentrate at Skouries
After years of delays, Eldorado has produced first concentrate from its Skouries copper-gold project in Greece. Commercial production is targeted for Q4, with the mine expected to average roughly 67 million pounds of copper annually over a 20-year life.
/ Anglo-Teck Wait Shows Mining M&A’s Rising Toll
China remains the last major regulatory hurdle for the $54 billion Anglo American–Teck merger, despite the combined group representing only around 5% of global copper production. Beijing’s review has revived memories of Glencore-Xstrata, when Chinese approval ultimately came with the forced sale of Las Bambas.
/ US Aims to Issue Deep-Sea Mining Permits Within Months, Interior Secretary Burgum Says
Washington says it could begin issuing deep-sea mining permits within months as it looks for new sources of copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese outside Chinese-controlled supply chains. Commercial seabed mining remains unproven, but the permitting push is moving from theory toward policy.
That's the wire for today. Until next time, may your copper stay on the right side of the border.
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